New Documents Released from the Office of Saddam on MEK

For the first time, two sets of documents from Saddam's intelligence service’s correspondence with MEK in 1988 were published, containing ammunition and weapons requests from the Ba'ath party after Operation Mersad.

MEK had been receiving considerable support from Saddam’s regime since June 1986, when it was firmly based in Iraq. This support, which continued until the fall of Saddam in April 2003, had different dimensions ranging from receiving large quantities of weapons and ammunition and military bases to various financial and intelligence support. Representatives of the organization also regularly interacted with representatives of the Ba’athist regime's intelligence apparatus. The orders related to the organization’s support were followed by the intelligence system and even the country's administrative and military structure.

According to Habilian Association, Tasnim published the documents recently released, for the first time, by the Institute for Political Studies and Research. These two sets of documents from correspondence between the Ba’ath intelligence service and Saddam’s office date back to 1988 shortly after the Mersad Operation.

The first document

In August 1988, about two weeks after the MEK’s defeat Operation Mersad, the head of the Iraqi intelligence service wrote a letter to Saddam's office informing him of the MEK’s request for ammunition. The head of Saddam's office wrote a letter to the army chief of staff agreeing to the delivery of the items to the MEK.

Letter from the head of the intelligence service to Saddam's office

To the head of the Presidential office

Subject: Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization

The representative of the Mujahedin Khalq Organization has requested that the equipment and materials listed below to be used by their fighters, who have already completed their military training and be placed in the barracks of the Second Corps, which is dedicated to that organization in the city of Al-Khalis.

1. 300 rounds of 30 mm rockets for BMP-1 Armored Personnel Carrier’s SPG-9 recoilless gun

2. 250 rounds of 100 mm ammunition for T55 tank

3. 150 rounds of 90 mm ammunition for EE-9 Cascavel

Please consider and order what you find appropriate.

Regards

Head of the intelligence service

Saddam's office order to Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army

Honorable Chief of Staff of the Army

Subject: Delivery of equipment

Mr. President agreed to hand over the following equipment to a national body and take appropriate measures in coordination with the security service.

Regards

1. 300 rounds of 30 mm rockets for BMP-1 Armored Personnel Carrier’s SPG-9 recoilless gun

2. 250 rounds of 100 mm ammunition for T55 tank

3. 150 rounds of 90 mm ammunition for EE-9 Cascavel

Presidential Chief of Staff

CC:

Office of the head of the intelligence service

Letter No. 3591 dated August 17, 1988, for appropriate action

The second document

In a letter to Saddam's office in November 1988, the head of the intelligence service pointed out that there was a misunderstanding with the representative of the organization to receive some ammunition and weapons, and asked Saddam's office for the command. In its final recommendation, the intelligence service grants its full consent to continue the process of giving ammunition and equipment to the organization for educational use. In response to the letter, Saddam's office agrees.

Letter from the head of the intelligence service to Saddam's office

To the head of the presidential office

Subject: Mujahedin Khalq Organization

In response to your secret sealed letter No. 4576, dated October 30, 1988, we hereby inform that:

We conveyed the order of President (May Allah Protect him), issued through His Excellency's letter, to the representative of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization. We also received the statements of some of the (Iran) regime’s prominent figures, some questions, and a list of (requested) weapons and supplies which are attached.

After reading what the representative of the organization had given us, we did not find satisfactory answers to the orders of Mr. President (May Allah Protect him), and we discussed it with the representative of the organization on November 30, 1988. He said that he had brought the matter to Mr. Rajavi and that the organization does not have definite and reasonable answers to the requests of the President (May Allah Protect him), because the issue is complex and precise, and it is difficult to give an accurate answer based on speculation.

Intelligence service recommendation

The intelligence service continues to pursue the accountability of the Mujahedin Khalq.

The intelligence service suggests continuing the delivery of weapons, materials, equipment and ammunition, only for military training and based on the conditions and time of their request. In addition, His Excellency’s agreement in your secret and sealed letter No. 3585, dated August 31, 1988 was based on the use of the available weapons of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization for military training. Because these equipment and materials require specific storage conditions, fields and controls, and until the appropriate political conditions are provided between the two sides, we will ask the Mujahedin to list their needs for military training, given their current cache of arms.

Please note and issue your order.

Regards

Head of the intelligence service

Attachments:

12-page report

List of weapons, materials and equipment 3 items



Saddam’s office responds to the head of the Intelligence service

Intelligence Service - Head Office

Subject / Mujahedin Khalq Organization

Mr. President agrees with the security that was stated in letter No. 4873 dated November 15, 1988. Please provide the needs of the organization for educational purposes.
To make and announce the appropriate decision.

Regards

Head of the Office of the President