Regional affairs and terrorism analyst Seyyed Reza Qazvini says Iraq’s obligations under its security agreements with Iran and provisions of the Iraqi Constitution require Baghdad to address Iranian judicial requests concerning leaders of PJAK, Komala, the Democratic Party and PAK.
He argued that failure either to extradite or prosecute individuals accused of terrorism could amount to inadequate judicial cooperation and raise questions over the Iraqi central government’s ability to exercise authority over its territory.
In an interview with Iranian Diplomacy, Qazvini discussed the legal and political implications of Interpol notices concerning leaders and members of Kurdish armed groups based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
The full interview follows.
Question: Iranian courts have issued judicial rulings, Interpol Red Notices and extradition requests concerning leaders of PJAK, the Democratic Party, Komala and PAK. From the perspective of international law, what obligations does Iraq have in responding to these requests? Could failure to extradite or prosecute these individuals domestically amount to a violation of judicial-cooperation obligations?
Qazvini: Iraq, as an Interpol member state, is expected to review Red Notices and respond in accordance with its domestic law.
The key point, however, is that a Red Notice is not an internationally binding arrest warrant. It is a request to law-enforcement authorities worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending possible extradition, surrender or similar legal action.
Iraq’s legal obligations toward Iran primarily depend on bilateral agreements on mutual legal assistance, where applicable, as well as international counterterrorism conventions to which Iraq is a party.
In my view, Baghdad essentially has two possible courses of action: extradition or domestic prosecution.
If Iraq refuses extradition without a legitimate legal basis and also declines to prosecute the individuals itself, that could be interpreted as a failure to provide appropriate judicial cooperation, particularly where terrorism allegations are supported by documented evidence.
Iraq may, of course, have legal grounds for choosing domestic prosecution rather than extradition.
If neither happens, prolonged delays are likely to be interpreted in Iranian public opinion as incomplete cooperation with international counterterrorism mechanisms and inconsistent with the principles of good-neighborly relations.
Question: How can provisions on extradition and joint counterterrorism cooperation in the recent Iran-Iraq security agreement facilitate implementation of these extradition requests? How do you assess implementation of this part of the agreement so far?
Qazvini: The Iran-Iraq security agreement includes several key areas of cooperation, including the disarmament of armed groups in the Kurdistan Region, deployment of Iraqi federal forces along sections of the border between Iran and the Kurdistan Region, and measures concerning individuals wanted by Iran.
The agreement therefore takes the extradition issue beyond routine administrative correspondence and places it within a broader operational security framework.
Iraq has also committed to closing camps used by these groups and relocating their members away from border areas to designated sites deeper inside Iraqi territory.
Implementation, however, has been partial.
The central government has succeeded in disarming or restricting some camps and strengthening control in certain border areas, but extradition of senior figures has faced serious obstacles.
The Kurdistan Regional Government, where many of these individuals reside, has shown greater resistance to handing them over.
To date, no confirmed case involving the extradition of a senior leader of these groups to Iran has taken place. Iraqi measures have largely been limited to relocation and restrictions on residence and movement.
The agreement is therefore useful, but not sufficient on its own. Its effectiveness depends on Baghdad’s political willingness and practical ability to exercise federal authority in the Kurdistan Region.
There are also, in my assessment, external political pressures that may affect the regional authorities’ willingness to cooperate.
Question: Articles 7 and 8 of the Iraqi Constitution address terrorist organizations and Iraq’s relations with neighboring states. What legal and political consequences does the continued presence of these groups’ leaders in the Kurdistan Region create for Baghdad and the regional authorities?
Qazvini: The Iraqi Constitution prohibits terrorist organizations and requires the country to conduct its foreign relations on the basis of good-neighborliness and non-interference.
From Iran’s perspective, the continued presence and activity of armed groups using Iraqi territory to operate against Iran is inconsistent with those principles.
Legally, Tehran could argue that Baghdad has failed to meet its international obligations if Iraqi territory is used for attacks against Iran and Iraqi authorities fail to take reasonable preventive action.
Politically, this also raises questions over the central government’s effective authority over the entirety of Iraqi territory.
In my view, continued failure by either Baghdad or the Kurdistan Regional Government to prevent armed attacks could also increase the likelihood of unilateral Iranian military action against these groups inside the Kurdistan Region.
The regional authorities face an additional political dilemma. They seek to uphold a tradition of providing refuge while also being bound by Iraq’s federal Constitution and security obligations.
The issue gives Baghdad grounds to increase pressure on the Kurdistan Regional Government over border-security powers.
At the same time, the continued presence of armed opposition groups risks reinforcing the perception among neighboring countries that the Kurdistan Region functions as a safe haven for armed, separatist or militant organizations.
Inside Iraq itself, the region has also at times been accused of sheltering fugitives, opponents of the central government and figures associated with the former Baathist establishment.
If the situation continues, it could increasingly turn the Kurdistan Region into a source of regional security tension.
Question: Extradition requests have also reportedly been sent to European countries including Belgium, Germany, France and Sweden. Despite Interpol Red Notices, why are some European governments reluctant to approve or seriously pursue these requests? What effect does this have on the credibility of international counterterrorism mechanisms?
Qazvini: There are several reasons for European hesitation.
One factor is the political relationship between European governments and the states submitting the requests. Decisions concerning armed or militant opposition groups can be influenced by broader diplomatic considerations. Critics describe this as a distinction between “good” and “bad” terrorism.
Another issue concerns the underlying criminal allegations.
Many of the individuals concerned are regarded in Europe as political opposition activists rather than terrorists. European governments distinguish between legitimate counterterrorism measures and the persecution of political opponents.
From the Iranian perspective, this may in some cases reflect political bias or double standards. But it may also partly result from shortcomings on our own side in presenting sufficiently persuasive legal and media documentation concerning the alleged crimes of these groups and their leaders.
There are also domestic legal and security considerations.
Some of the individuals have residency status or asylum protection in European countries. Extraditing them can therefore raise complicated questions under domestic law and international refugee and human-rights law.
Taken together, however, I believe the situation damages confidence in international counterterrorism mechanisms.
It creates a perceived double standard: Western states cooperate rapidly when threats directly concern them—for example, in cases involving ISIS—but subject requests from countries such as Iran to far greater scrutiny.
This creates a perception that counterterrorism cooperation is robust only when it aligns with Western geopolitical interests.
In the long term, that lack of trust may encourage states affected by terrorism to seek parallel responses, including intelligence, cyber or direct military measures, potentially creating even greater challenges for an already strained international legal order.