Among the surviving documents of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), The Commander's Voice is an audio recording of a speech by Mousa Khiabani, one of the organization's senior leaders. Published in March 1986, the document presents the MKO's retrospective account of how the organization transitioned from political activity to armed confrontation in 1981.
In the speech, Khiabani argues that the organization's adoption of armed struggle was not an immediate response to the events of June 20, 1981. Instead, he contends that it "emerged from within the organization's nearly two-and-a-half-year movement" and represented "its logical continuation."
The MKO's shift from political activity to military operations was not a strategic change but the implementation of a pre-planned phase within an established framework rooted in the organization's view of the newly established Islamic Republic.
Ideological and Political Background
The Commander's Voice begins by asserting that the MKO believed it had understood the nature of the new government from the outset. Khiabani states, "We knew that eventually [the regime] would turn its blade against our necks as well." This statement reflects the organization's long-term strategic outlook during the post-revolution period. Khiabani characterizes the conflict as one between "two opposing natures": what he describes as "reaction and backwardness," represented by the Islamic Republic, and "revolution and progress," represented by the MKO.
Based on this interpretation, the two and a half years following the revolution were not viewed by the MKO as a period of coexistence or political reform. Rather, Khiabani describes them as a period devoted to expanding the organization's social base and increasing public awareness until, in the organization's view, the true nature of the Islamic Republic became evident to the public. This strategy was intended to strengthen the organization's position in preparation for a future confrontation rather than to reform the political system.
Evidence of Strategic Continuity in The Commander's Voice
In the recording, Khiabani describes a period during which the MKO claims to have suffered "approximately 50 martyrs," "thousands wounded," and "hundreds imprisoned," while stating that it had not "fired a single bullet." He presents this restraint as evidence of a deliberate strategic decision rather than a retreat.
The organization could have resorted to armed action earlier but chose not to because it "did not want to give the reactionaries the opportunity to lower the blade at a time when its nature had not yet become clear to the people." He portrays the organization's political activities during this period as preparation for a future armed confrontation.
Throughout the speech, Khiabani presents the MKO as "the people's only hope" and identifies the overthrow of the government as its primary objective. He describes participation in elections and newspaper publication as means of exposing what the organization considered reactionary forces and expanding its support base rather than as efforts to reform the existing political system. He repeatedly emphasizes that building a social base and raising political awareness were the organization's principal objectives during this period.
June 20, 1981: The Beginning of the Armed Phase
According to The Commander's Voice, June 20, 1981, marked the point at which this long-term strategy entered its armed phase. Khiabani describes the date as "the end of one period and the beginning of another." However, he argues that this transition was not a spontaneous decision. Instead, he states that the "line of armed struggle... was not a spontaneous, unexamined, or unforeseen move." Rather, after what he describes as "two and a half years" of navigating a "difficult and turbulent path," the organization concluded that it was time to "leave the previous frameworks and enter a new space and framework."
Khiabani further suggests that the events of June 20 were not an unplanned protest but a deliberately organized action prepared "with full force for another great test."
A central theme of The Commander's Voice is Khiabani's argument that armed struggle was not merely a reaction to events but an "objective necessity" and "the only correct response to preserving the revolution." Responding to potential critics, he argues that "any other line besides armed struggle... would mean abandoning the people and the revolution to the clutches of reaction."
The document indicates that the organization's turn to violence in the summer of 1981 was not a sudden strategic shift but the implementation of a long-planned course of action. The MKO viewed itself as being in fundamental conflict with the new political system from the outset and regarded its earlier political activities primarily as preparation for an eventual armed confrontation.