Following reports of the beginning of attacks by the United States of America and the Zionist regime against our beloved country, these events have been described with terms such as “war,” “war crime,” and “terrorist act.” This variety of descriptions raises the question of exactly which legal framework these actions fall into: Are we facing a war, examples of war crimes, or even terrorist actions? These titles are not merely verbal differences; each carries important implications in the domain of international state responsibility and the possibility of criminal prosecution of the perpetrators.
From the perspective of international law, the first step in analyzing such a situation is to establish the existence of an “armed conflict.” According to the criteria set out in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and international jurisprudence, any resort to force between states that reaches the level of military engagement can be considered an “international armed conflict.” In such a case, the entire situation falls under the governance of international humanitarian law—a set of rules whose main objective is to limit the effects of war and protect civilians.
However, applying the title “armed conflict” or “war” alone is not sufficient to evaluate the legal behavior of the parties. What is of fundamental importance is the manner in which the parties behave during this conflict. International humanitarian law emphasizes fundamental principles such as the “principle of distinction” (distinguishing between military and civilian targets). According to Article 51 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, direct attacks against civilians are prohibited, and Article 52 stresses that civilian objects, including schools, hospitals, and vital infrastructure, must not be targeted. In the published news, numerous examples of clear violations of these principles can be observed:
On 9 Esfand 1404, high-ranking officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including His Excellency Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, were targeted by missile attacks in a non-military environment. Two weeks later, on 28 February 2026, Ali Larijani and his companions, and on 18 March 2026, Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Ismail Khatib along with members of his family, were all attacked in non-military locations. Targeting individuals in such places, especially in the presence of civilians, directly conflicts with the principle of distinction and the prohibition on attacking civilians.
In this framework, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), in Article 8, identifies some of these violations—if committed in the context of an armed conflict and with a sufficient nexus to it—as “war crimes.” These include intentional attacks on civilians, educational and medical centers, and other civilian targets. Therefore, attacks on schools, hospitals, or causing extensive civilian casualties in the context of an armed conflict are clear examples of war crimes, as they constitute blatant violations of peremptory norms of international humanitarian law.
Alongside this, the concept of terrorism is also emphasized in important documents such as UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) and numerous General Assembly resolutions. These stress that intentional violent acts against civilians with the aim of creating fear among the population or coercing governments fall under terrorist behavior. In this context, what matters is the nature of the act and its purpose, not merely the identity of the perpetrator. For this reason, the literature of international law speaks of state terrorism.
In addition to international instruments, Iran’s domestic laws have also defined and criminalized terrorist actions. According to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Law on Combating the Financing of Terrorism (Articles 2 and 3), any action based on creating fear and terror among the people or putting pressure on governments through violence—regardless of whether it is carried out by non-state groups or foreign governments—is considered a crime, and its perpetrators are subject to criminal prosecution. Therefore, attacks that result in the killing of civilians, children, and the targeting of educational institutions and hospitals can also be considered terrorist actions under this law.
Accordingly, attacks that deliberately target civilians or civilian objects such as schools and hospitals—if carried out with the aim of creating public fear or exerting political pressure—possess the characteristics of terrorism. This description does not conflict with the title of war crime; rather, the two can apply to the same behavior.
In conclusion, the question of whether this situation is war or a terrorist action is a binary and somewhat oversimplified one. In reality, armed conflict describes the overall situation, while war crime and terrorist actions concern the legal evaluation of specific behaviors within that situation. A conflict can simultaneously be an armed conflict and include actions that are prosecutable as war crimes or terrorist behavior.