The eight-year Iran-Iraq War was fought not only at the border, speakers at a Habilian media forum said, but also against groups acting within Iran. Held during Sacred Defense Week at the Qods Cultural and Arts Center, the forum examined “The Role of Terrorist Groups in Three Wars Imposed on Iran.” Researchers and specialists discussed alleged fifth-column activity, the MEK and separatist groups, and gaps in how the victims of terrorism have been remembered. The organizers said the event sought to recover a historical record they believe has been distorted.
Opening the forum, Mohammad Javad Hasheminejad described the geopolitical environment at the start of the Iran-Iraq War. He said Eastern and Western powers, as well as European states, gave broad support to Baathist Iraq, while neighboring countries poured large sums into Saddam Hussein's war effort to defeat Iran's young Islamic Republic. He called Iran's eight years of resistance with limited resources a new chapter in modern warfare.
Hasheminejad said that resistance had continued in the decades after the war. In his account, the same adversaries pursued their objectives through proxy wars and new fronts but failed again. He attributed Iran's successive victories to divine will favoring the oppressed and described the country's endurance under extensive pressure as exceptional.
He then turned to Habilian's two decades of research into terrorist crimes and what he called a major gap in public remembrance. Although the foundation has identified 23,000 Iranians killed in terrorist acts, he said, the country lacks sufficient memorials and dedicated spaces for survivors and victims. According to Hasheminejad, supporters of terrorism exploit this weakness to misrepresent the record internationally.
Another speaker, Nezampour, examined armed activity and what he described as a fifth column. He asked why the role of internal collaborators receives so little attention during Sacred Defense Week and accused the MEK, Komala, and the Democratic Party of contributing to insecurity along the borders. He also characterized the conduct of Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, then commander-in-chief, as an example of obstruction and betrayal at a high level of command in the war's early period.
Nezampour divided the developments in Kurdistan into two major battles. The first, he said, began as the revolution succeeded, amid unrest involving Komala and the Democratic Party. He criticized the strategic decisions of the “Goodwill Delegation,” arguing that its approach allowed counterrevolutionary forces to empty military garrisons and caused the security crisis to spread dramatically.
Citing figures from affected towns, he said Sardasht was completely besieged by counterrevolutionary forces for 14 months and that more than 80 assassinations of pro-government personnel were recorded in Baneh over a 100-day period. He also alleged that militants infiltrated defending forces under the guise of instructors, surrounded them, and directly undermined combat operations.
Alizadeh then assessed the armed groups from a social and behavioral perspective. Referring to the work of resistance-literature author Kianoush Golzar Ragheb, he argued that understanding these groups does not require one-sided accusations. If reading documented accounts leads people to reject Komala and the Democratic Party, he paraphrased the author as saying, the groups should address their own violent actions and positions rather than blame the writers.
Alizadeh also assessed the MEK against the Quranic phrase “firm against the unbelievers, compassionate among themselves.” He called the organization's conduct a reversal of those values. In his account, the group was ruthless toward unarmed compatriots but deferential to the Baathist forces occupying Iranian territory. He said that contrast explained widespread public hostility toward the MEK and the loss of its social base during the conflicts.
In the final part of the forum, Sarabandi described the military and propaganda dimensions of the MEK's relationship with Baathist Iraq. He identified June 1986 as a turning point. At that time, he said, the organization presented Saddam Hussein with a portfolio of its intelligence and sabotage activities and secured land that became Camp Ashraf, establishing a formal base on Iraqi soil.
Sarabandi accused the group of using religious imagery to justify its actions during the wars. For operations such as Chelcheragh, he said, its leaders told fighters that sacred figures including Imam Ali had come to their aid, using such claims to encourage them to fight fellow Iranians.
He also described the MEK as absorbed into Saddam's propaganda effort. Members wrote slogans such as akh al-muqatil (“brother fighter”) at the front to encourage Iraqi soldiers, he said. According to Sarabandi, the group adopted the invaders' language to the point of praising the assault on Iran as al-Qadisiyah al-Jadidah (“the new Qadisiyah”) and portraying it as a great Iraqi military epic that would be recorded in history “in letters of light.”