Less than a month after the announcement of a ceasefire in the Zionist regime's aggression against Iran, the separatist and terrorist group PJAK, which had been inactive in terrorist operations against Iran for about two years, has re-emerged by carrying out several operations in Iran's border regions, leading to the martyrdom of a number of Iranian border guards. The question that arises is: Why has PJAK, after a two-year lull, once again resorted to armed operations against Iran?
Following severe military attacks by Iran's armed forces against the positions of terrorist and separatist Iranian Kurdish groups based in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in September 2022—where the bases of a number of Kurdish factions in Koysanjaq, Alton Kupri, and Zargawiz in the Kurdistan Region were targeted—a Tehran-Baghdad security agreement was signed between Iran and Iraq in February 2023. Key clauses of this security agreement included the disarmament of separatist Kurdish factions based in the Region and the transfer of their forces to camps, moving them away from the northwestern borders of Iran.
The result of Iran's attacks and this agreement was a significant reduction in the terrorist operations of these groups to such an extent that from July 2023 to July 2025, terrorist operations by Kurdish groups against Iran had virtually dropped to zero.
However, as mentioned, from July 20 this year, the terrorist faction PJAK, after a two-year lull, carried out its first terrorist operation. Within five days, PJKA conducted three armed attacks against Iran's border guard forces in the provinces of Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan, resulting in the martyrdom of four Iranian border guards.
In examining the influential and interested parties benefiting from the terrorist activities of terrorist factions against Iran, the Zionist regime is a principal and beneficiary side. Israel recently concluded a 12-day assault on Iran. Although this aggression inflicted heavy blows on the country, its primary objectives, including changing the political system in Iran, failed to materialize. Iran remains a serious and potential danger for Israel. Therefore, a complex hybrid war, part of which involves supporting terrorist groups to keep Iran preoccupied and inflict damage, could be a policy of the regime in its conflict with Iran.
The open support of Kurdish factions for Israel's aggression against Iran during the 12-day war should not be overlooked. The security interests of the Zionist regime lie in creating insecurity and unrest in Iran, and these groups, including PJAK, can secure these interests with the financial and logistical support of the Israeli regime. The influence of the Zionist regime in the Kurdistan Region can also contribute to the reactivation of these factions after two years and enable their movement from deep within the Region to border areas with Iran—despite the existence of a security understanding between Iran and Iraq.
On the other hand, following the PKK's announcement to lay down its arms, it seems PJAK is not unwilling to carry out such supported terrorist activities to demonstrate its non-compliance with the PKK's decision. Amir Karimi, one of PJAK's joint commanders, said in a media interview in late May this year: "PJAK will neither dissolve itself nor lay down its arms; this decision is announced with full transparency so that everyone receives a clear answer." Naturally, the disarmament and cessation of PKK activities should, at least logistically, have some impact on PJAK's activities. However, the explicit statement by the PJAK commander indicates that support for the continuation of this group's activities, by states or intelligence and security services, and even despite the relative restrictions created in Iraqi soil, has been considered by this faction.
Another question that arises is: How likely is the continuation of PJAK's armed and terrorist activities against Iran, and what factors does it depend on? Firstly, it must be said that PJAK carrying out three operations in one week indicates that what occurred was not an unplanned event. Executing this number of operations in a short span of a few days points to targeting and planning. Therefore, the continuation of these operations within the framework of the outlined situation of the Israeli regime's confrontation with Iran, after the end of the 12-day war, can be expected. Preventing the potential continuation of these operations must also be defined under Iran's severe action in confronting this faction inside the Kurdistan Region. Furthermore, the use of pressure tools that Iran can employ against the Region, if used with seriousness and power, could lead to intensified restrictions against these factions and their movements and travels within the Kurdistan Region.
Using the card of terrorist groups in various parts of Iran, particularly in the northwestern and southeastern regions, could be part of the tools of the Israeli regime's hybrid war against Iran. It is crucial that this tool becomes a burnt card, so as not to lead to the occupation of part of Iran's security and military capacity in the future and turn it into a complex and serious situation.