Why were armed groups operating along Iran’s eastern borders unable to carry out a significant operation during the latest war, despite what Iranian sources describe as extensive foreign financial, intelligence and logistical support?
The question may offer insight into a less visible dimension of Iran’s intelligence and counterterrorism operations during the conflict.
In the months following the outbreak of hostilities, reports attributed to U.S. sources circulated claims that, if accurate, could provide part of the explanation.
According to those accounts, Iran succeeded during the height of the fighting in targeting 12 covert facilities allegedly linked to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in several Arab countries.
The reported operations were said to have killed a number of senior intelligence officers and personnel.
Among the alleged targets was a meeting in Dubai attended by an intelligence officer said to have been responsible for coordinating contacts with armed groups operating along Iran’s eastern frontier.
According to this version of events, the loss of that liaison disrupted the command-and-control network connecting external sponsors with armed groups and significantly reduced their ability to plan and execute coordinated operations inside Iran.
From a security perspective, proxy warfare depends on far more than the battlefield capability of individual armed groups.
Continuity of intelligence exchange, command structures, logistical support and operational coordination is often just as important.
Disrupting those networks can leave even relatively organized proxy groups facing uncertainty, poor coordination and fragmented decision-making.
In some cases, severing communications and command links can have a greater operational impact than directly targeting fighters on the ground.
Developments along Iran’s eastern border appear, according to Iranian security assessments, to reflect such a pattern.
Armed groups in the region have reportedly continued to face operational difficulties, while sustained intelligence surveillance and military readiness by Iranian security forces have sharply restricted their room for maneuver.
As a result, they have not only failed to conduct coordinated operations but have also faced difficulties carrying out significant independent attacks.
If the reports regarding disruption of the external command network are taken as a basis for analysis, the relative calm along Iran’s eastern border during one of the most sensitive phases of the conflict cannot be attributed solely to weaknesses within the armed groups themselves.
It would instead suggest a combination of disrupted command, reduced external support and stronger Iranian intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities.
The broader lesson is that in hybrid and proxy warfare, disrupting the command center can sometimes prove more decisive than confronting individual fighters on the battlefield.
By Morteza Khosravi