Today Mehran, tomorrow Tehran: How Rajavi Scarified 2,500 Troop (Part Three)


[On the atmosphere inside Camp Ashraf at the time of cease fire's adoption by Iran]
 “About three weeks had passed since the capture of Mehran.  On July 18, 1988, we were informed via Farsi radios that the Islamic Republic Regime has officially accepted Resolution 598 of the Security Council. The brigade was shocked by hearing this news. No one believed that the regime one day would accept a cease-fire. The organization’s leadership had induced us that the regime would not accept any ceasefire and peace. The Mojahedin had analyzed the acceptance of peace as a corded for the Islamic Republic […] Upon admission of the cease-fire by the regime, all of us, even the top-level ones, realized that the peace is a corded for Mojahedin, who has hung itself into the hook of the Iran-Iraq war. The incident made it possible to uncover many of the issues that were still covered. Including the coming of the Mojahedin to Iraq totally became a question. Until the official position of the organization to the cease-fire was not announced, the atmosphere inside the organization was still tense […].


[On Rajavi’s meeting with Saddam]
Since the news of a cease-fire until announcement of the overthrow operation, Rajavi met with Saddam three times. At the last meeting, he had promised Saddam that if the Mojahedin has a one-week deadline, it can overthrow the regime by mobilizing all its forces. Due to Rajavi's excessive persistence, Saddam finally agreed to give him the last chance. Saddam promised Rajavi every kind of help, including logistical and air support until the overthrow of the Islamic Republic regime. After meeting with Saddam, Rajavi, as the commander-in-chief of the Liberation Army, with announcement of a 100-percent stand-by, ordered the troops to be prepare within a few days for a decisive battle that will be the last operation of National Liberation Army. The announcement of alert for the Operation Forough was given while the fatigue and injuries caused by the operation Chelcheragh remained on the body and soul of the forces […].


[On briefing of troops before the operation]
On July 23, 1988, from 7:00 to midnight, Rajavi and his wife, Maryam, were briefing troops for the operation. Rajavi spoke as if all Iranian people were counting the seconds for Mojahedin to arrive Iran and welcome them. According to Rajavi, when wee attacked Iran, we would not face any resistance and after a few hours the regime will be overthrown. When Rajavi was talking, one of the crowds moved up and asked what would happen if the people did not help us. Rajavi tried to suppress him [...] Rajavi did not count on retreat and defeat. He thought that the troops would advance to Tehran without a retreat or a stop; therefore, we had given each one an identification form to give it to the champion people of Iran in case of injury […].


[On advance of troops inside Iran]
On Saturday [July 23th], the pioneer brigade dispatched its troops towards the border. The rest of Rajavi's army moved on Monday, July 25th. At 9pm on Monday, we arrived in Islamabad . After entering Islamabad, we continued our way towards Kermanshah . In several stages, the pioneer brigade had collided with a barrier, but they were able to move easily to Kermanshah. On Tuesday, July 26th, all Mujahedin army forces stopped at Hassanabad Strait. According to Rajavi's plan, all troops should move from Baghdad to Tehran through the main road in a column. No other method has been considered in this operational plan. Considering that no other tactics were discussed, we could not continue to advance on Tuesday in Hassanabad and then the Chaharzebar Strait. Rajavi sent a message from Iraq saying that you should fight tooth and nail to cross the Strait […].


[On cessation of troops in the Chaharzebar Strait]
The commanders continually dispatched a brigade of troops through the Hassanabad plain, which was in full view of the regime's forces, to the battle area. The forces, without thinking and just acting upon the commanders’ orders, were moving under the heavy fire of the regime and were killed shortly after. They did not even try another plan to go to Kermanshah via another way except the main road. […] Rajavi did not have any plans for supplying ammunition to the battlefield. When the bullets were over, there would be no more ammunition. When you asked for bullets, the answer was a hundred percent negative. The only answer you received was that, according to the Brother (Rajavi), the forces should fight tooth and nail and without ammunition to convey the leadership to Tehran […].


Military weapons of the Operation Eternal Light
The Mojahedin's forces did not have sufficient mastery over the use of heavy and semi-heavy weapons. For example, Cascavel tanks that we took to the war zone were not used because they did not even shoot a bullet. In the Hassanabad Strait, we did our best to launching a tanks’ gun and DShK, but we couldn’t. The only weapons we were able to use were Kalashnikov, BKC, RPG, and hand grenades for suicide while arrested. By copying the machines used by some countries to suppress the street protests, the Mojahedin had built a car that chairs were installed on its both sides. People equipped with the most elementary weapons sat on both sides of it and were dispatched to the classic battlefield. These machines did not have any security shields. If someone was lurking on the road, he could easily fire all the passengers, and it was occurred […].


Logistical Support for the Operation Eternal Light
Rajavi counted heavily on the Iraqi Army's air support for the Mojahedin in conquering Tehran; because it had provided support for all of the Mojahedin’s border operations against the Islamic Republic Regime. In the operation of occupying Mehran, when the Mojahedin approached the border line, Saddam's army provided the MEK with the biggest fire. In fact, without the Iraqi Army's fire support, the Mojahedin could not move one step further, let alone conquering Tehran. In Operation Forough, as long as the Mojahedin received Iraqi ground and air support, it could continue to advance to Tehran. But when the forces were besieged by the Islamic Republic Regime in the Chaharzebar Strait, there was no further help. Rajavi commanders who were on the scene constantly requested air support, but no support was given for them. […] The scene of war was so irregular that once the Iraqi Air Force dropped the bombs over the Mojahedin's supporters, instead of bombing the Chaharzebar Strait […].


The regime’s casualties during the Operation Eternal Light
After the end of the operation and the return of the remaining forces to the base, meetings were held in connection with the conclusion of Operation Forough and the statistical provision on the regime’s casualties. During these meetings, everyone tried to kiss Rajavi's feet by overtaking the other in exaggeration of the number of enemy casualties. For example, our brigade, which did not shoot a bullet due to the bugs in cascavel and weapons, announced that it has annihilate more than 1,000 people from the Islamic Republic Regime. There is no doubt that some of the forces of the Islamic Regime were killed in this operation. But the astronomical statistics of 55,000 deaths, which Rajavi announced after conclusion of the operation, was nothing but a big lie. Rajavi's astronomical statistics were only due to the consolation of the forces and to wipe put bitterness of failure. In fact, Rajavi wanted to say that if we had 1,500 deaths, Instead, we killed 55,000 of the regime's forces […].


Return to Iraq after the failure of the Operation Eternal Light
After the scandalous defeat of the Operation Eternal Light with the death of most of the forces, especially those who were married and having children in the camp, everyone was drowned in confusion and mournfulness. Camp Ashraf was gloomy like a cemetery. Those who managed to return to the camp alive, became very depressed when they saw their friends' vacancies. Observing this atmosphere, Rajavi decided to put the forces under pressure by launching multi-day sessions. He wanted to shift the responsibility of other forces’ Killing to those who managed to return to the camp alive either healthy or wounded. During one of these sessions, Maryam Rajavi said that if you had faith in Rajavi, you would not have survived. You had to fight tooth and nail to cross the Chaharzebar strait.  You were stuck behind your individual straits. That is, you were not united with the leadership of Rajavi. Those who were united were killed […].


[…] Whenever I recall the days of the conflict and the death of so much Mojahed, I ask myself was seizing power worth it that Rajavi sacrifices more than 1500 people? Was Rajavi not saying that peace is the Islamic Republic regime's corded? So why did the mujahedin rush to such an extent when the ceasefire was announced?”

 

Link to the part 2

Link to the part 1


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