

The Watchlist

Monitoring Terrorist Threats in West Asia

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Families of Iranian Terror Victims

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ASMLA; terrorist immigrants in the land of Vikings

Five Decades of MEK's Terrorism: From Militia to Terrorist Cells

Unaudited Costs; An In-Depth Report on the MEK's Huge Expenses

Women's Rights Abuses inside the MEK

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Introduction

People of southwestern Khuzestan province have been victims of war and terrorism within the past few decades. Since Saddam's invasion of Iran in 1980, this province was the main location which came under the Iraqi Baath Party's sustained attacks and its residents suffered the heaviest damages.

Mainly inspired by Saddam's and Baath Party's thoughts, multiple terrorist and separatist groups perpetrated acts of terror in this province even after the termination of war, and based on the available evidence, the majority of their victims were civilians. All these terrorist groups have offices in European countries, Australia, and north America.

Perhaps, one such prominent group is the Denmark-based Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA). In 2005, the group established a military wing and its former leader- who has Swedish citizenship- is now standing trial in Iran. The group's leader before him is imprisoned in Denmark on charges of sponsoring terrorism in Iran and conducting espionage on behalf of Saudi Arabia against Denmark. The group's opposing party operates under the same name in the Netherlands and it is not unlikely for this group to be causing trouble for Amsterdam.

The ASMLA conducted many terrorist operations such as bombings and assassinations in various locations in Khuzestan which have led to the death of 23 civilians. Bombing Saman bank in Ahvaz in January 2006, which inflicted 5 casualties (3 males and 2 females), is one of the greatest crimes this group has committed against innocent civilians.

Over the years, victims of this separatist terrorist group, which claims to be fighting for the rights of Arab citizens of Khuzestan, have been Arab civilians themselves. Separatism and terrorism are two despicable keywords in the literature of international politics. The least expectation which Iranian families hold is for the European countries where these terrorist groups reside to listen to the voice of terror victims and act justly.

S.M.Javad Hashemi Nejad



ASMLA; Terrorist Immigrants in the Land of Vikings



For more than 15 years, the survivors of terror attacks in Iran have been seeking to prosecute leaders of the Arab Struggle Movement for Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA) terrorist group. Since the establishment of the group's military wing namely Mohiuddin al-Nasser Martyrs Brigade in 2005, Iranian citizens in the southwest of the country have been subjected to bloody terrorist operations resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths and injuries. When the target of attacks are public offices, banks and crowded streets, the victims will be defenseless citizens including women and children.

Source: habilian.ir



Founded upon the claim of liberating regions with Arab residents, the ASMLA carried out 18 terrorist attacks and sabotage acts throughout Khuzestan Province from June 12, 2005 to May 15, 2017 which inflicted over 300 casualties. This group has officially admitted to all these operations leaving no room for denial by its leaders.

Bombings in locations such as the governor's office, buildings of Management and Planning Organization, Roads and Urban Development Office and also in front of the house of the IRIB's head of Ahvaz on June 12, 2005, bombing oil processing facilities and pipelines of Zargan County in Ahvaz on September 1, 2005, bombing in Salman Farsi street of Ahvaz on October 15, 2005, detonating oil pipelines of Station No.7 in Abadan on October 26, 2005, bombing the Saman Bank in Kianpars neighborhood and the Department of Natural Resources and Watershed Management of Ahvaz on January 24, 2006, bombing Dezful and Abadan governor's offices on February 27, 2006, murdering a clerk named Seyed Taher Mousavi in Shushtar County. Murdering a clerk named Seyed Taher

Moosawi in Shushtar County on December 18, 2008, murdering Abdossadeh Ka'ab, a water pumping station guard in Shadravan District in Shushtar County on March 22, 2009, attacking a police station in Gamboe Forest Park in Hamidiyeh on April 2, 2015, detonating oil pipelines in Khuzestan Province on December 28, 2015, detonating oil pipelines in Khuzestan Province as a response to the attack on the Saudi consulate in Mashhad and Tehran on January 2, 2016, detonating oil pipelines of Zargan County in Ahvaz on June 14, 2016, detonating Khuzestan oil pipelines on January 3, 2017, and assassinating Hossein Sharifi, head of the Ramshir city Intelligence Office on February 15, 2017 are part of this group's violent, terrorist acts.

In addition, claiming responsibility for the terrorist attack on September 22, 2018 which left 25 dead and 68 injured while ISIS also accepted its responsibility reveals the strong inclination of this group's leaders for resorting to violence and terrorist acts in Iran. Statements of Yagoub Hor Tastari, the group's spokesman who is currently in the hands of the Danish judiciary, in



an interview with Iran International TV regarding the legitimacy of the mentioned terrorist attack signifies this group's violent, ruthless temperament and its disregard for human lives.

The support which may lead to more terrorism, sabotage acts, killing and injuring more innocent civilians in our country is seriously worrying. A group of immigrants in Denmark and Netherlands exploit the current situation and utilize the Danish and Netherlands soil as a hub for spreading their terrorist and sabotage acts. Habib Osaïved, former leader of ASMLA, who is now under trial in Iran is a Swiss citizen.

During the recent years, the separatist terrorists have clearly made the Northern Europe a center for their activities. Separatists who fled Iran after committing terrorist and destructive acts in the country, resettled

in Europe, obtained citizenship after passing through security filters and keep operating there without restraint. Taking advantage of the situation, they turned those countries into a hub for their espionage and terrorist activities against their former country and their new host.

It will fall short of our expectations if we assume that security agencies in Europe were unaware of these people's backgrounds when they first entered these countries. So one can imagine how these individuals and groups have served the political interests of these countries. In any case, the case of ASMLA's spying against their new country, Denmark, should create a serious alarm for all European countries regarding the members of terrorist groups in order to deal with terrorism in a non-political context.

A fake letter that put lives at stake



Since mid-2004, a group of separatists who had fled abroad such as the National Resistance Front of Arab People of Ahwaz created a program called Al-Ahwaz and broadcast it through the Bayn al-Narayn satellite channel. They implemented various propaganda techniques to propose the issue of separation of Khuzestan from Iran and also to provoke ethnic differences in order to incite Arab people of this region to make separatist movements.

Under a pre-designed scenario, the separatist activists abroad widely distributed a fake letter attributed to the office of the president among Arab regions of Ahwaz and other Arab cities of the province, including Mahshahr, Susangard, Abadan, Shadegan and Khorramshahr at the end of 2004.

The content of this fake letter implied that the Islamic Republic of Iran was seeking to change the demographic makeup of Khuzestan and disperse Arabs throughout the country. This propaganda caused violent unrest in the province.

In their websites, satellite channels or through sending couriers inside the country, the separatist groups abroad caused insecurity in the province of Khuzestan by directly and publicly encouraging people to continue and spread the riots. These groups include the Ahwazi Democratic Popular Front led by Mahmoud Mazrae (aka Abu Bashar), the Democratic Solidarity Party of Al-Ahwaz led by Mansour Silavi (aka Mansour Ahwazi), the Nehzat Al-Ahwaziyah Party led by Seyed Ayoub Mousavi (aka Seyyed Sabah

Source: habilian.ir

Mousavi), the Ahwazi National Council led by Seyyed Hashem Nemati Taleghani (aka Seyyed Taher Ale-Nemeh), Ahwazi Organization for the Liberation of Ahwaz led by Faleh Nikoueresht, and the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz led by Habib Nabgan.

In the consequent riots, more than 35 members of police and Basij forces were injured and substantial damages amounting

"The separatist groups incited the people in the region to violence and expanded the riots to the cities of Mahshahr, Susangerd and Khorramshahr"

to tens of billions of tomans were inflicted on public and private sites. For instance, over 80 buildings, facilities, state-owned banks and government and personal vehicles were damaged or destroyed.

The separatist groups incited the people in the region to violence and expanded the riots to the cities of Mahshahr, Susangerd and Khorramshahr.

The law enforcement officers of Khuzestan Province were able to curb these riots within a few days. The separatist elements, next, turned to terrorist and underground activities. On June 12, 2005, Muhyiddin Al Nasser Brigades, the armed wing of Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz, bombed 3 government buildings:

Governor's Office, Management and Planning Organization, and Housing and Urban Development Organization. In addition, the house of the deputy of Khuzestan province broadcasting was bombed. A total of 7 citizens were murdered, 96 were injured, and public and private buildings were considerably damaged in these attacks.

On September 1, 2005, oil well No. 149 and two oil pipelines in the Farhangian region of Ahwaz exploded which caused more than 10 billion tomans of financial damage. Following this attack, on October 15, 2005, two bombs were detonated in Salman Farsi street of Ahwaz killing 7 civilians and injuring 90 others. A number of vehicles, shops, and buildings also sustained superficial damages. Afterwards, Mofakkerat-ol-Islamiyah website published a statement by Seyed Ayoub Mousavi (aka Seyed Sabah), the leader of Nehzat Al-Ahwaziyah Party, in which he took credit for June 12, 2005 bombing in Ahwaz.

On February 25, 2006, Saman Bank of Ahwaz and the Department of Natural Resources of Khuzestan Province were targeted and bombed leaving 7 citizens dead and 45 injured. The separatist group which was determined to assassinate innocent people and fight against the Islamic Republic of Iran, bombed the governorates of Abadan and Dezful on February 27, 2006 injuring several people. Since April 15, 2005, the separatist movements abroad have been claiming responsibility for these riots and bombings in statements, announcements, interviews, etc. and have been emphasizing that they will continue to do so until achieving their ultimate goal i.e., the separation and independence of Khuzestan. On the other hand, they have been making baseless complaints and presenting false reports to international human rights organizations about how the Islamic Republic of Iran treats Arabs while aiming at seeking asylum and citizenship from countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, the United States, Sweden, Kuwait and other European countries.

Victims of ASMLA Attacks



D.C Zanganeh



S.T Moosawi



R.Zoveldavian



H.Shahitat



J.Mazrinejad




S.T Moosawi



A.Ansari Dezfuli



A.Allafzadeh



A.Ka'ab



G.Narimisa



F.Aqajari



M.Lakzadeh



M.A Cham Haidari



F.Zaheri Abdovand



S.Rashidi



E.Mansoori



N.Ayyashi



M.M Nemat Parvizi



M.Orak Sussan



A.Jalizi



M. Daneshian

Five Decades of MEK's Terrorism: From Militia to Terrorist Cells



Throughout the contemporary history of Iran, numerous militia groups have been formed especially among the left streams, among whose common features are violent and terrorist measures. Although those groups were formed to fight the ruling political system, most of the victims of their operations were civilians. The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, also known as MKO or MEK, is one of the most well-known of these groups that officially launched its militia in the first months of the victory of the Islamic Revolution and started a period of violence and bloodshed in different parts of Iran. Now, nearly two decades after the MEK's disarmament, the group has re-launched its terrorist cells under the new name "rebel centers."

According to dictionary definitions, militia is a military force that is raised from the civil population to supplement a regular army in an emergency. Also, it has

Source: [Ebi Spahiu](#), [Terrorism Monitor](#), [Balkananalysis](#)



been defined as a military force that engages in rebel or terrorist activities in opposition to a regular army. What is meant by militia in this article is the latter definition i.e., the organized armed insurgent forces in the first years of the Iranian Revolution.

After the Islamic Revolution, the term militia was first used in Iran by the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) although this concept was not unfamiliar to left-wing groups. According to the statements and documents the MKO left behind, Massoud Rajavi, the group's leader after the Revolution, announced formation of the militia on November 23, 1979 although it was officially announced on 27th of November in the Mojahed Magazine. The militia was an organized non-professional force whose members could continue education and work as well as organizational activities. Hence, a militia can perhaps be called a "part-time guerrilla" or, in MKO's words, "part-time fighters" emphasizing its military and armed nature.

The reason behind formation of the militia

After the siege of the American embassy and Ayatollah Khomeini's mass mobilization order i.e., "the army of 20 million" on November 26, 1979, the MKO announced

the formation of its militia. According to the military-political declaration No. 23 on November 23, 1979, the militia branch was formed in the MKO. In order to justify arming themselves and the formation of this small private army, the MKO announced that they aimed to stand against the United States (Collection of Declarations, Vol. 2, pp. 140-141). Mojahed, the official magazine of the MKO, on November 27, 1979 in its special issue No. 2, thanked Imam Khomeini and tried to turn the Supreme Leader's order to its advantage by calling its militia the army of 20 million. They issued this statement: "And now all the revolutionary forces, all the brave warriors of the army and our brothers in the Revolutionary Guard Corps are to do everything in their power to establish the 20-million revolutionary army in particular and also organize the militia of thirty-seven million people".

Next, the MKO issued another statement under the title of "regulations for carrying and maintaining weapons and objectives of the militia" to justify arming of most of their members. During the victory of the revolution, many army garrisons were looted by members of the MKO, and the group's military branch, which had been active since 1971, was also illegally armed. Therefore, they used to pretend that their armed organization is somehow related to the regular armed forces in an effort to prevent

sensitivities that arose after the formation of their militia.

Actions taken by the militia

Since January 1979, the militia was used as a lever at the service of propaganda techniques and social missions to disrupt social order and create confrontations in some neighborhoods of Tehran and other cities. Activities of the militia units augmented during the first presidential election campaign in support of Bani Sadr. Students made up majority of the members of the militia, and, given their revolutionary spirit and great interest in military and armed activities, they constituted a major part of these organized units' recruits. According to the policies of the MKO leaders before the crucial period of June 20, 1981, the militia units made several symbolic moves during this period in order to flaunt their power to the opponent. These units performed maneuvers to show their social power at different times such as December, January and February of 1980. At the time, Maryam Qajar Azdanlu (Rajavi), the current leader of the MKO, had various responsibilities with respect to organizing the women's militia and leading female students' revolutionary campaigns of construction activities in rural areas (Kayhan newspaper, March 10, 1980, p. 15). The militia marched from the University of Tehran to the US Embassy on Wednesday April 9, 1980, in order to demonstrate its firm grip on the opponents.

Following the tensions created by the MKO, on June 13, 1980, the militia demonstrated simultaneously in 10 locations in Tehran to exhibit its power. In this series of demonstrations, dozens of ordinary people and individuals resembling government supporters (characterized by being religious and having a beard) were beaten or injured by cold weapon. Dozens of buses, motorcycles and people's automobiles were set on fire and the MKO chanted mottos against Shahid Beheshti and the Islamic Republic Party and in favor of Bani Sadr. Most of the militia's encounters in the clashes were physical and

involved the use of cold weapon. Members of the militia had received military training and acted in an organized manner and could easily identify the opposition and beat them more. Throughout 1980, the militia started major riots in the cities of Sabzevar, Isfahan, Karaj, Abadan, Gorgan, Ghaemshahr, Tehran and Shiraz. Presence of the militia during Bani-Sadr's speech at the University of Tehran on March 5, 1981, and its subsequent clash with government supporting forces was another manifestation of this militant group of the MKO.

On the afternoon of June 20, 1981, while the political inadequacy of President Bani Sadr

"The MKO had pinned its hope on the militia as a means of executing the group's authoritarian intentions."

was being examined in the Parliament, the militia which was equipped with knives, cutters, brass knuckles, Molotov cocktails, acid sprays and firearms (only for group heads and main cadres), organized demonstrations on streets of Tehran to revolt against the ruling government. Simultaneously with the movements in Tehran, similar sporadic clashes took place on a smaller scale in several cities such as Isfahan, Hamedan, Urmia, Shiraz, Ahvaz, Arak, Zahedan, Masjed Soleyman, Bandar Abbas and Mashhad, during which dozens were injured and several were murdered (IRIB Website).

Most of the militia's activities were



propaganda and sabotage. Up till June 20, 1981, the militia mostly performed as guardians of meetings and lectures of those they believed in. The activities they performed later on include selling the group's publications, collecting financial aid for the benefit of the group, organizing construction campaigns in deprived areas of the country, and military activities. Construction activities of the militia and their presence in villages were mostly to compete with the Jihad of Construction (Jahād-e Sāzandegī), to carry out propaganda in favor of the MKO, and to gather supporters for this group, which in most cases failed. In fact, these actions of the militia, similar to the reason of its formation, were in competition with revolutionary institutions and organizations such as the Basij Force.

Having the illusion of owing the revolution, the MKO at this time tried to emulate the government structure as if it were a legitimate ruling system. The MKO had pinned its hope on the militia as a means of executing the group's authoritarian intentions. Rajavi acknowledged that his militia had about 10,000 capable troops and used it to distract the ruling government. This half-baked idea of the MKO soon created the illusion of being able to stand against the government. By triggering their revolt on June 20, which

led to the apprehension or escape of the MKO militia members and exposure of their weaknesses not only in terms of military power but also in even revolting, this illusion quickly faded (Website of Rahenoo News Agency).

Formation of National Liberation Army

In the street clashes of the summer of 1981 and on September 27, the militia, whose philosophy of existence was to form a private army for the promised day, entered the social insurgency phase once again by provoking students. According to the available documents, the militia organized eight unsuccessful riots between 1983 and 1985, which were of course much smaller than the flood of people supporting the revolution and simply failed. Nonetheless, the large-scale assassinations of government officials and ordinary people may be considered the greatest achievement of the MKO militia in these years (Document Archive of Habilityan Association).

Coming to know its inability to conduct terrorist attacks inside Iran and according to the MKO's policy on exiting the country, the militia gradually moved to Iraq and with the benefit of Saddam's military and logistical

facilities, changed its name to the so-called National Liberation Army in 1987. In his statement for the establishment of this army, Massoud Rajavi described the militia as the nucleus of the Liberation Army and said in that regard "... this is why the MKO founded the militia in the first year of (Ayatollah) Khomeini's ruling" (Document Archive of Habilian Foundation). This so-called army of the MKO carried out several military operations against Iran on the battlefields during the last two years of the Iran-Iraq war and was eventually destroyed in Operation Mersad.

After the US occupation of Iraq in 2003, the MEK which was listed by the US as a terrorist group, was forcibly disarmed by the US Army and the group's military wing was forced to hand over its heavy and semi-heavy weapons to the US forces in Iraq.

The MEK has since tried to adapt its tactics to the new situation. So, in order to get out of the terrorist lists in the UK, EU and US, it took a new approach that was more like a tactical change than a strategical one. In this way, through launching a political and propaganda campaign against Iran, the group sought to persuade the West that it is the only alternative to the Islamic Republic. In recent years, however, the MEK has attempted to direct its regime-change activities inside Iran by organizing its forces in the form of terrorist cells called "rebel centers".

The fact is that the foundation of this group relied on armed activity both at the time of the official announcement of the formation of the militia in 1979, and during the 1980s. Thus, with Donald Trump coming to power and his non-diplomatic behavior and actions against Iran, the MEK gained the opportunity to gradually revive their past militant approach after 13 years of forced disarmament.

Launching terrorist cells

The MEK considered Trump to be the last circle of pressure on Tehran, whose unprecedented encounter with the Islamic

Republic would lead to the collapse of the ruling political system in Iran. Thus, by focusing on the establishment of violent and terrorist cells inside Iran, they challenged the claim of some viewers regarding the group's transition from military stage to the political phase and proved that the Mojahedin is still a violent militant group.

The remarks made by some senior MEK members during Trump's presidency regarding the group's new terrorist cells, known as rebel centers and describing them as an extension of the National Liberation Army militia prove that the political gestures of the MEK leader, Maryam Rajavi, are nothing but a deceptive approach to gain the support of some European and American politicians.

During the same period, the MEK carried out dozens of sabotage and violent operations against various targets in Iran. Although those operations did not cause any casualties or damage, the very establishment of terrorist cells and encouragement of the youth to join these destructive centers as well as inciting them to attack governmental and non-governmental sites, are examples of promoting violence and terror, and are as illegal as the threats of Canadian anarchist extremist groups to target the country's infrastructure.

Now, with the end of the Trump era and fading of the MEK's aspirations in the US presidential election, it remains to be seen whether the group's terrorist cells will continue to act or not. Regardless of the ineffectiveness of the actions of these cells inside Iran during recent years, what seems to be important is that Europe has probably inadvertently become the main focus of the elements of this violent and terrorist group. Previously only present in Western Europe, former pro-Saddam Hussein militia terrorists have now spread to the other side of Europe, the Balkans.

Unaudited Costs;

An In-Depth Report on the MEK's Huge Expenses



MEK's Camp in Manez, Albania

In a world where terrorists have engulfed us and killed legions of innocent civilians everywhere for their ideologic and political purposes, financial backing plays a key role in maintaining their existence. Terrorists adopt numerous ways and methods for financing their activities. The traffic in human, organs, drugs, arms and smuggle in artefacts and gasoline are among the methods employed by most of the terrorist groups and what's more, receiving financial support from some intelligence services has been one of the most common ways for the terrorist groups to achieve money and logistics in return for their services.

Finally, money-laundering is being used by the groups as a way to remove all

traces of the incomes in order to argue that they have received their financial sources through legal economic activities.

During the recent years, most countries and international organizations have performed many restricting activities on war against money-laundering and terrorism financing, but terrorists have always found an array of tactics to circumvent the restrictions.

Although it may be more difficult and more complicated than other methods to block the financial supports of these groups by intelligence services, because of the covert backing of the governments, a constant monitoring and control of international



financial institutions over these groups and organizations and using mechanisms that force them to make their financial resources and spending more transparent, can prevent them from bypassing international restrictive measures.

The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization is an example of this description, which we will examine its financial status in this report.

People ask how an organization that, despite being on the terrorist list of countries such as the US, Britain, Canada and the EU, can cover its operating expenditure, invite and pay for domestic and foreign guests and hold costly annual gatherings in one of the largest conference halls in Europe?

What makes this question significant, and the lack of a definite answer to it adds to the concerns is that the MEK is an armed group

with a Marxist background that, in addition to assassinating a number of US citizens in Iran during the 1970s and conducting suicide operations on a number of Iranian clerics in 1980s, have killed some 12000 Iranian citizens during the same period and ended up in Iraq as an ally to the Iraqi dictator. The concerns are heightened when a group with such a dreadful background, whose deceptive activities continue to be corroborated by think tanks and intelligence services, has used its financial resources to change into a terrorist threat again. Particularly, because the group, according to international documents and reports, was forcibly disarmed in 2003 and the surrender of its arms was not voluntarily. Even now, the leader of the group constantly makes his terrorist threats through its Persian-language -- not English -- social media pages.

Now we have to raise the key question: how such an organization with 2300 uniformed members in a large camp in Albania, over 200 others in France and the US, a 24/7 satellite channel, several web-sites and thousands of real and fake social media accounts, large number of gatherings and costly annual conference in different parts of Europe and the US, etc. can meet its exorbitant costs?

The MEK announces that it has full financial independence, secured only through Iranian citizens supporting the group. In November 2019, the MEK claimed that it had asked every single Iranian citizen for \$10. Later, they announced that they gathered a total \$6.9 million! From what channels did they receive the donations? Why were the documents showing the transfer and deposit of the aid never published? Assuming that the announced number is correct, from which channel will the other huge monthly expenses and their capital expenditures be provided?

Habilian Association, a center for terrorism studies in Iran which is in charge of enabling the terror victims to sue the terrorists, has recently published a study on the MEK's monthly expenses during the recent years and achieved significant numbers.

Taking into account the main locations of the MEK namely Tirana, Paris and Washington, this report has done its best to roughly estimate the operating expenses as well as the fixed expenses and capital expenditures of this group. When estimating the operating expenses, multiple internet resources, reliable websites and statements of former MEK members were used to calculate costs of living in the aforementioned cities. In some cases, where different prices for a given product or service were available, the average price or sometimes the minimum one was used in our estimation.

In addition, we avoided mentioning some of the capital expenditures and operating expenses for which we had no realistic estimates and reporting them would have reduced the accuracy and precision of our calculations. However, some of these expenses are indeed significant. For instance, in the annual rallies of the MEK in Villepinte, Paris, considerable sums of money are spent on decoration, lighting, filming etc. Similarly, there are incalculable expenses in Tirana camp as well. Examples include costs for construction of the museum inside the camp and lavish colorful decorations. Also, since it is not known how often senior members of this group travel between their location in Paris and Tirana camp, these costs were not calculated.

One of the most exorbitant operating expenses of the MEK is for food of 2300 members in the Tirana camp. Costs of three meals plus snacks along with basic utilities such as electricity, water, internet and heating and cooling systems come to a total of over 1 million dollars monthly. The average expense of shoes and clothing of members is \$1,265,000 yearly which is roughly \$105,000 a month. Even though these members receive only 10 dollars monthly in return for being constantly exploited, \$23,000 as pocket money in a month is a rather high number.

There are also such expenses for MEK members in both expensive cities of Paris and Washington. Taking into account both official and non-official members of this

group, we have estimated their expenses in US and France to be over \$337,000 per month. Other expenses of this group including domain, web-hosting and renting 3 satellites for their channel are more than \$132,000 monthly.

Adding up all figures showed that only the operating expenses of the MEK terrorist group reach \$1,600,000 monthly. This number for a group, which seemingly has no economic activities is extremely odd and questionable. It is worth mentioning that expenses related to audio/video equipment such as CCTVs as well as studio equipment

"Adding up all figures showed that only the operating expenses of the MEK terrorist group reach \$1,600,000 monthly"

required for broadcasting programs on satellite channels which are approximately \$73,000 are considered the MEK's capital expenditures and are thus excluded from the group's operating expenses.

More surprising is the construction costs of this group's camp in Manz, Tirana. Assuming that the camp land was given to the MEK by the Albanian government for free, this land which has got about 347,000 square meters of area was fully constructed by the MEK from scratch. There are offices, compounds and residential areas in this camp and the construction is still ongoing. Supposing that only %60 of the whole camp area has been constructed- satellite images of the camp show a higher percentage- the cost of building this camp given the constructions costs in Albania, are more than 136 million dollars.



MEK's Annual Gathering in the Paris Suburb of Villepinte

Other general or personal facilities that individuals need such as a closet, bed, fridge have not been included in the price. Nonetheless, costs of gym equipment in the camp's gym are over \$60,000. Doubtless one of the highest expenses of this group throughout the years has been the purchase of 1700 personal computers from an Albanian company right after settling in the camp. According to international reports and statements of the ex-MEK members, these PCs have been used as a tool to manage fake accounts of this group in Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and Telegram 24/7. Investigations indicated that this group paid more than \$609,000 dollars to buy purchase these computers.

Apart from operating and capital expenses, the MEK hold numerous costly gatherings with their supporters during a year. In 2019 alone, the group held 12 events with foreign guests. Their annual and regular conferences are always held at the beginning of the summer at the Paris Conference Center in Villepinte, in one of its largest halls. In addition to foreign guests who are former and retired personalities, hundreds of foreign

students and homeless French people, especially from minorities, attend these events. The present report is based solely on fees paid to foreign speakers and their ticket and hotel fees, while it excludes the cost of transporting international students from all over Europe by bus to Paris and a meal, as they have remarked in interview with various media.

From 2014 to 2018, 296 foreign personalities and former and retired officials attended the annual Villepinte gatherings to deliver speeches in support of the MEK. The Mujahedin paid more than \$ 1.5 million for their flight to Paris. The cost of accommodation of these people in hotel is estimated at 207 thousand dollars. This is not the end of the story of Villepinte and its guests.

According to numerous international reports, which have been noticed by the US Department of Treasury, the MEK pays significant sums of money to former officials to speak in support of the group and demonize the Iranian government. According to Eli Clifton, a fellow at the Quincy Institute

and an investigative journalist who focuses on money in politics, the Mujahedin pays \$30,000 to \$50,000 to former senior officials to give speeches to the group. It is estimated that the MEK has paid nearly \$11 million to 363 speakers who attended the group's events in Vilepinte and Tirana from 2014 to 2019.

Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the MEK has tended to organize online events rather than face to face conventions. Benefitting from the new condition in terms of travel and accommodation expenses for foreign guests, the group continues to pay the speakers, although half of the amount.

The MEK's annual gathering in 2020 was held online on July 17, in which 133 high-profile personalities delivered lectures. It is estimated that the group has paid about \$2 million to the speakers.

In addition to the annual regular conventions, the MEK also holds sporadic events in different European and U.S. cities. From 2019 to 2021, at least 255 speakers gave lectures at various events held by the MEK around the world, costing the group more than \$2.5 million. The calculations did not include costs such as poster and banner printing, photography, catering and decor decoration.

All that said is just part of the amazing expenditures of money by the MEK. Offering staggering sums into a violent terrorist cult without any audit and control, leads to nothing but promoting hatred and violence.

The MEK claims complete financial independence saying that all its expenses are covered by the Iranian people. For example, in 2019 they claimed that, \$ 6.9 million was donated to the group by the people. Which and how many people provided this large amount? Iranians living abroad or Iranians inside the country? How and through what channels have Iranians been able to bring such a large amount to a terrorist group, given the US sanctions and the difficult economic situation? To which bank accounts? Are we facing a special money laundering? A number of seemingly pro-MEK Iranians who have the money of this group and they, as Iranian citizens living in Europe and the United States, send that money to the group's accounts in the name of humanitarian aid?

If we accept this amount, what will happen to the other staggering operating and capital expenses of the MEK? According to the present report, these expenses, which are merely in the field of operating expenses related to food, nutrition, internet charging, water and electricity, etc., for the Albanian-based forces, excluding France and the United States, are more than \$ 19 million per year, nearly three times as much as the \$ 6.9 million donated by Iranian citizens. How do the rest of these costs financed?

The MEK must at least be accountable to international financial institutions.

Women's Rights Abuses Inside the MEK



The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization is one of the rare terrorist groups whose subjects and victims do not fall into a simple classification and cover a wide range of innocent civilians. The MEK tortures and violates the rights of its own members particularly women's rights.

MEK has confined hundreds of women to its walled compound, once in northeast Iraq and now in southeast Europe, on the pretext of protecting their rights. A number of violations of women's rights have been reported so far by a number of its defected members and international rights groups and institutions.

Source: habilian.ir

Human Rights Watch

One of the main reports on the MEK's rights abuses was released in May 2005 by Human Rights Watch, which was quite clear on the MEK's abuses. One of the chapters of the book details the "compulsory divorce" within the MEK camps, where the members were forced to renounce their emotional ties to their spouses through divorce.

The report quotes one of these members as saying how this process unfolded following the group's humiliating defeat in its last offensive within the Iranian borders in late 1980s:

"The first thing I was required to do in Baghdad was watch a videotape of an ideological meeting for "executive and high-ranking members." The meeting, called "Imam Zaman," started with a simple question: "To whom do we owe all our achievements and everything that we have?" ... Rajavi did not claim, as I thought he might, to be the Imam of our times, but merely said we owed everything to Imam Zaman... The object was to show that we could reach Tehran if we were more united with our leader, as he was with Imam Zaman and God. He was ready to sacrifice everything he had (which in fact meant all of us!) for God, asserting that the only thing on his mind was doing the will of God.... We were expected to draw the conclusion that no "buffer" existed between Rajavi and Imam Zaman; yet there was a buffer between ourselves and him [Rajavi] ... which prevented us from seeing him clearly. This "buffer" was our weakness. If we could recognize that, we would see why and how we had failed in Operation Forogh [Eternal Light] and elsewhere. Masoud and Maryam [Rajavi] had no doubt that the buffer was in all our cases our existing spouse."

The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum

The second report is a 2009 report from the nonpartisan Rand Corporation. Titled as The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy

Conundrum, the report revealed that MEK members were strictly segregated by gender and they were "severely socially and emotionally isolated, even within their communal living arrangements.

Relatives and former spouses are placed in different compounds and are not allowed to see each other."

In another part of the report, the gender segregation in MEK camps is highlighted, disputing the group's claims of sexual equality and so forth: "Housing is segregated by gender, and in other buildings, lines are painted down the middle of hallways, separating them into men's and women's sides. Men and women below the leadership level are prohibited from contact with one another unless they have obtained official case-by-case permission. Shaking hands is prohibited across genders. Even the gas station at Camp Ashraf has separate hours for men and women."

US Court of Appeal

The third report citing violations of women's rights by MEK is one of documents obtained by the US Court of Appeals in 2010. In January 2010, MEK challenged its FTO status before the US Court of Appeals for the fourth time. During the briefing in this case, the US Secretary of State provided unclassified record with formerly classified materials to the court in order to sustain the MKO listing.

"Among the disclosures in the declassified material: the MEK trained females at Camp Ashraf in Iraq to perform suicide attacks in Karbala."

From the above reports and dozens of other defected members' accounts, it can be concluded that MEK, despite its outrageous claims, does not hesitate to use women as a tool and it also deprives them of their most basic rights, i.e. being free to have marital relations.

The MEK is a Hybrid Terrorist Organization



Xavier Raufer is the Director of Studies and Research at the Department for the Study of the Contemporary Criminal Menace at University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas. He is also an Associate Professor at Chinese National Police University and China University of Political Science and Law. A world-known criminologist, Professor Raufer published more than twenty books on terrorism, crime or urban insecurity, among which: *On social violence* (1983), *The Superpowers of Crime*, *Narco Terrorism Survey* (1993), *Urban Violence and Insecurity* (1998-2003), *The Albanian Mafia* (2000), *The Al Qaeda Enigma* (2005), *Atlas of Radical Islam* (2007), *The Dark Side of Globalization* (2009), *Cyber-Criminology* (2015) and *Globalized Crime* (2019). According to Raufer, the most dangerous security threat in in today's

world is a new range of terrorists who calls them “Hybrid Terrorists”, who are created from combination of most of what was in the 20th century “ideological terrorism” on the one hand, and “Organized crime” on the other. The Paris University Professor classifies ISIS and the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization among these hybrid terrorist organizations. What come below is the full text of Habilian Association’s interview with this experienced criminologist.

Habilian: Professor Raufer, according to your main expertise, namely terrorism and criminology, if you like, we start the

“A global war, largely asymmetric, lacking any kind of control or legal limitations, in which a great neo-imperial power doesn’t so much deploy its forces against individual states as against groups of global partisans (Kosmospartisanen) that operate worldwide using the means and pursuing the objectives of a civil war.” [1]

Thus, today, a body of “global partisans” called “Islamic State” (hereafter IS), “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant”, ISIS, ISIL, “Daesh”, or the “tafkiris.” [2] has been wreaking havoc amidst a huge media din. This, as all the former, “classical” forms of



conversation with the issue of similarities and differences between terrorism and organized crime.

Raufer: Let us start with a broad vision of what is in 2019 human hostility, for most parts of the world. Yet, in our chaotic world, can one imagine future confrontations and enemies? Now and even in the past decades? Yes, one can - sometimes even, well in advance. In 1938, the German publicist and professor Carl Schmitt described the global unrest of the future in the following terms:

terrorism, including the ben-Laden-type jihadis, have vanished from Europe - or are mostly disbanded (IRA, ETA). Out of 28 countries of the European Union, 24 have had no serious terrorist attack on their soil since 2009. The ultimate indigenous terrorist group in Europe, in Italy, is a ghostly “Informal Anarchist federation”, having, in 2012 and 2013, mailed two parcel-bombs (to a newspaper in Rome, and to a police station in Brescia) - nothing since then.

So, early 2015, the attacks in Paris and

Copenhagen revealed a new type of terrorism in Europe, totally different from the al-Qaida-type, and its actors having nothing in common with the ben Laden-type terrorists. Since in the spring of 2012, in France, Mohamed Merah killed three French soldiers and attacked a Jewish school (7 victims), each and every terrorist having actually killed in Europe, belong to this new category we call hybrids, part criminal/gangsters and part terrorists.

All of them, hard-core criminal, not just some street thugs. Mohamed Merah, killed when he was 23 years old, had already been sentenced eighteen times - ten times for robberies. The other hybrids since then have similar profiles. None of them belong to structured organizations: two brothers here... a man and his wife there... nothing more.

All of them are more or less mentally unbalanced or have low IQ's. Mehdi Nemmouche, the killer of the Jewish museum in Brussels, has a 14 years-old boy's IQ. All of them are human bombs, killing on very short notice. Example: Mohamed Merah is on his scooter one morning around 8 am (in France, school opening time), waiting for the light to turn green. He spots a Hebraic inscription on a door... it's a Jewish school... kids entering with their parents... he starts shooting at once. One minute before opening fire, he himself did not know he would do it. Also, as criminal predators, these hybrids make money in any (criminal) way whatever. The Kouachi brothers (killers of Charlie Hebdo journalists) used to sell counterfeit sportswear, after dealing drugs.

Broadly this is the terrorism we are now suffering in Europe - what we call the dark side of globalization. In our world, most of what was in the XXth century "ideological terrorism" (whatever the original causes, national liberation, etc.) on the one hand, and "Organized crime" on the other have now more or less merged in hybrid and fluid entities. In Europe, the two last "old style" terrorist entities, IRA in Northern Ireland and ETA in the Franco-Spanish Pays Basque,

renounced terrorism because they clearly understood that, to keep on fighting, they would have to become gangsters.

Habilian: Regarding your experience as a former member a far-right group and given your research projects and writings on the so-called Islamic Extremism, do you see any similarity between these phenomena?

Raufer: We now see what is nowadays called "Islamism terrorism": either hybrid family clans (the Kouachi brothers... The Abdesslam brothers... Amedy Coulibaly and his wife...) Or, in the Middle-East, bizarre entities as the "Islamic State", that look more like mercenary groups than a proper - old style national liberation army, for example.

Those entities couldn't be more different from far-right killers-terrorist like M. Breivik in Norway or M. Tarrant in New Zealand. The way these far-right assassins kill, their itinerary before the killings, doesn't at all look like "nationalist" terrorism, or "islamist" terrorism, but completely, like American mass killings, like for instance the one in Las Vegas in October 2017, when M. Paddock killed 58 people in a concert - and to this day, nobody knows why he did it.

Men like Breivik and Tarrant express frustration because of their country's "foreigner's submersion"... Publish manifestos or videos on the Internet. There may be hundreds of such angry and frustrated men across Europe or elsewhere in the West - and suddenly, one of them takes action, after a usually lengthy incubation period (ideology, logistics, etc.). Here, the difficulty is in the number of xenophobic fanatics - and the fact that only very few of them (thanks God) mutates into a mass killer.

Habilian: Why far-right terrorism has not been on the agenda of intelligence agencies in Western countries?

Raufer: All over the world, police, security and intelligence services have this in common: they only fight one enemy at a time. During the Cold War, for Western intelligence, it was of course the KGB, etc. Then it was salafi jihadists Ben-Laden type.



Now, they (slowly...) understand that the hybrids are the target.

See what happened in London and Madrid, when bombs exploded, dozens of people killed in 2004 and 2005. The Spanish and British officials were obsessed by, respectively, ETA and IRA, and refused to hear the warnings, to see the symptoms of future salafi-jihadi attacks.

Also, the Breivik-Tarrant attack is rather uncommon - and the politicians push their police and intelligence where the last bomb has exploded, where the last killing has occurred. Of course, symptoms exist of a Breivik-Tarrant attack - spontaneous generation neither exists in biology nor in criminology. But these attacks are rare: Breivik in 2011... Tarrant in 2019 - a Breivik-copycat attack indeed, but eight years after.

Habilian: As a university professor and expert on terrorism and criminology, what do you suggest to security agencies to properly respond to terrorist threats?

Raufer: There is no effective response - only early warning is efficient. The security equivalent of preventive medicine. Either you act before the killer starts shooting, or it is too late: from Utoya island in Norway, to Las Vegas, and to Christchurch in New Zealand. And what some western politicians call "deradicalization" is just wishful thinking. If a method allowed to change what is in a human being's mind we would know it - and his inventor would have received the Nobel Prize, minimum.

Of course "social engineering" helps, learning to masses of citizens to peacefully live together - but as a criminologist, this is far from my domain, and I leave it to sociologists, psychologists, etc. One troubling thing, though: New Zealand's prime minister's refusal to even name the killer. Everyone knows that whenever a problem occurs (if your child is sick...If your car refuses to start, etc.), the first step of any diagnosis is to name the disease, or the breakdown. Maybe this lady confuses governing and political correctness...

Habilian: In your opinion, how likely is it to repeat events such as the Christchurch attack in the future?

Raufer: Yes of course, if it doesn't become a priority for the anti-terrorist organizations. But this threat will remain low-intensity: maybe one or two attacks in a decade - of course, many deaths each time, but a rare occurrence. To be efficient, a police or intelligence structure must be given priorities: personnel, finances, technical means, capacity to produce early and sure diagnosis. If those conditions are met, the danger usually disappears sooner or later. But as told before, those far-right terrorists are few. In political terms, is it possible to transform those rare acts into priorities? I doubt it.

Habilian: You had described the period between 1989 to 2001 as a "historical interval" in which the nature and pace of terror changed. Could we call the period between 2010-period, in which the ISIS was created, announced formation of Caliphate

and expanded its domain to European cities as another historical interval in formation of terrorism, or it is just a development within that period?

Raufer: After Oussama ben Laden was killed (may 2011), confusion started. Clearly, the period starting with the two first major al Qaeda attacks, (Nairobi, Dar-es-Salam, august 1998), with 9/11 as its apex, ended then. Then, appeared the totally different "Islamic state", looking more like an underground extension of Saddam Hussein's army, than any previous known Islamist entity. As some Iraqis said "Saddam's generals with beards and siwak". Is this entity truly committed to recreate a "Califate"? Or more like a mercenary organization? Here is the real problem. More must be done to identify the sponsors of such entities as ISIS or al-Qaeda - otherwise new terrorist eruptions can occur in the future.

Habilian: What's your idea about the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)? Could one describe it in the category of underground terrorist organizations during the Cold War?

Raufer: For my colleagues and myself, this entity looks more like an Asian cult (with a guru, etc.) than like a "classical" guerrilla or terrorist organization. For the European union and inside it, for example, the main worry concerning such entities as the MEK or the Kurdish PKK, is their extension as networks all over Europe. Entities difficult to infiltrate because of their fanaticism, and obviously committing many illicit acts, the most visible being racketeering, trafficking in drugs or human beings, etc.

Such structures are dangerous because they are permanent, some of them have been here almost since half a century, tightly knit - and have little political hope. For them, governing Iran for instance or having an autonomous-independent Turkish "Kurdistan", seems a remote hope - in the best of cases.

Thus, keeping thousands of people or families mobilized on the long run, represents a

lot of money and huge logistics, facilities, etc. Where does all this money come from? Everyone knows that governments or big business will easily fund anything once, but balks at open-ended funding. This is the real problem. And if the funding is illicit, where does it come from? Membership fees from party activists? Nobody believes that.

Habilian: The MEK founders sought to establish an Islamic government. For this purpose, however, they generously adopted elements of Marxism in order to update and modernize their interpretation of radical Islam. My question is that how do you analyse the paradox that group is experiencing, I mean swinging between Marxism and Islamism? Is this ideological shift common between terrorist groups?

Raufer: In the natural world, when a species is weak and has dangerous predators, it usually resorts to mimetism. As chameleons do with colours, a mimetic terrorist or guerrilla entity will easily pretend it is Islamic with Muslims, revolutionary with left-wing radicals, in



love with Uncle Sam with Americans, and so on. The mimetic entity doesn't defend any ideology or doctrine, but only wishes to survive. When you want to survive and cannot fight back, mimetism is the only option, I'm afraid.

Habilian: Regarding the MEK's opportunistic manner and its consecutive transformations, I mean from a classic leftist terrorist organization before the Iranian Revolution to a light-infantry military unit, equipped with Soviet-made armoured personnel carriers and artillery, which used to conduct attacks inside Iran, to an alleged opposition group that claims seeking peaceful transformation of power in Iran, could one describe it a hybrid terrorist group?

Raufer: Of course. Mimetism leads directly to hybridization. In other words, to mercenarism. Thus the danger: a hybrid-mimetic entity will hide its benefactor, sponsor or manipulator's true goals or objectives, behind a familiar or well-known mask: ideological, nationalist or else. This is of course true for MEK, but also for the so-called "Islamic State". Let's remember: When Abu Omar al-Bagdadi was eliminated near Tikrit in April 2010, the Bagdad press, who knew what it was talking about, unanimously referred to what was then "The Islamic State in Iraq" as a "small group".

Three years later (2013), the "small group", a riff-raff armed with Kalashnikovs, became the "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria". In 2014 (now disowned by al-Qaeda), it conquered, with hundreds of tanks and efficient heavy artillery, the northern third of Iraq - over 150,000 square km. The former "small group" was now capable, according to military experts, of "encircling or isolating enemy units, of disorganising enemy military staffs and supply routes". It was capable of "launching coordinated and simultaneous attacks", and its anti-aircraft capabilities were "serious" (helicopters shot down in flight). The "small group" had an elaborate strategy of lakes and dams (crucial for desert territory), with gunboats on the rivers and lot of drones.



This is why hybrid terrorist-guerrilla groups are so dangerous. And this is why scholars and experts from various countries and origins should meet to study and analyse this present serious threat - also, for the foreseeable future.

Habilian: Thank you very much Professor Raufer for your time.

[1] Carl Schmitt, *Guerre discriminatoire et logique des grands espaces*, Krisis, 2011.

[2] De Takfir wa'l Hijra is an Egyptian terrorist group which advocates an extreme form of Salafism, according to which most Muslims have descended into apostasy and thus deserve death.

This Week; a Magazine that Fell Victim to MEK Violence



Although it was not common among the armed oppositions of the Pahlavi regime to attack the press, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, for the first time, hit a magazine titled This Week which was being published in Tehran. It was launched in 1965 in English and from 1970 to 1972, it was printed in Persian as well. This magazine was the only pornographic magazine in Iran.z z

The editor of this magazine was Javad Alamirdolou, an experienced press agent who was a reporter in Ettela'at newspaper and Journal de Téhéran, manager of the Jam-e-Jahan Nama magazine, representative of Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision Française, and reporter of the L'Express and Le Monde.



“A magazine titled This Week was being distributed in which sexy photos were printed. It was the only magazine with nude pictures at the time. I felt responsible to stand against this magazine. I talked to Vahid Afrakhteh in that regard and told him that such magazines would be detrimental to the youth- who are our future fighters- and that we had to stop this magazine from perverting their minds. If the magazine’s office were blown up, people would develop better feelings towards the MEK.”

Vahid Afrakhteh shared my idea with the organization and they agreed with it. Afrakhte asked me to locate the office. It was on Shah street (currently the Jomhuri-islami Street). I provided Afrakhte with the address.

Not more than a few days had elapsed when I read in the newspaper, “Office of This Week magazine has been blown up”. The MEK had picked a time when all members of the editorial board were present at the office.

On the following day, Vahid Afrakhteh asked me in our meeting to keep the bombing incident secret and be really careful. However, the newspapers raved and wrote extensively about it. Anyhow, the explosion created a positive reaction and that magazine was closed for good.

The news of the explosion spread in the newspapers like wildfire for a couple of days and heightened on May 6, 1972, after a trade of fire on Khorshid St. between security forces and two bombers. One police officer and one of the suspects were killed in the shootout and the second was arrested. Ettela’at daily’s report of the events was as follows: “following the last week’s bomb explosion in the office of This Week magazine and the British Overseas Airways Corporation office, law enforcement and security forces arrested saboteurs in their hideout. A police officer identified as Second Lieutenant Ala’eddin Javid was martyred. One of the saboteurs was gunned down and the second, trying to slip away, was arrested. The downed saboteur was identified as Ali Asqar Montazeri Haqiqi, one of the members

On May 2, 1972, the magazine’s office was exploded (Ettela'at newspaper No.13785, p4) which attracted a lot of attention. The blast led to the injury of 5 people (3 men and 2 women) (Political Studies and Research Institute, the case of This Week Magazine). According to one of the perpetrators of this attack, the MEK had selected a day when all editorial board members had gathered together in a meeting (Morteza Alviri's memoirs, Islamic Development Organization, 1996).

Former mayor of Tehran and a member of the MEK at the time, Morteza Alviri who established the Fallah organization, played a role in the bombing incident. He was responsible for identifying and making a sketch of the magazine office. He writes in his memoir:

of the so-called Liberation Movement whose ringleaders, apprehended with a huge cache of arms, had been tried, and convicted.” (Ettela’at, May 8, 1972).

Following the news of Khorshid St. gun battle, other newspapers published the news of a shootout on Farhang St. and named the dead saboteur as Habib Rahbari (Ettela’at, May 9, 1972, p. 1). What matters most is that the newspapers i.e. the Shah’s security service a.k.a. SAVAK placed the responsibility of the blast on the Mujahedin-e Khalq (a.k.a. MEK, MKO, and PMOI) or according to the newspapers the “Liberation Movement”.

Despite other armed attacks, MEK did not publish a statement taking credit for the bombing. However, Mahdi Rezaei stated in his defense in the District Court in September 1972: “Before I was arrested, we conducted an operation, including detonating a bomb in the office of This Week. [...] I was not involved in the bombing and later I found out that five of the staff and directors of the magazine were injured.” (Ibid, pp. 76-77)

Attached is the then Information Ministry’s report of the exploded building and the

injured.

This explosion should be regarded as a string of blasts started back in 1970s by some groups’ armed and guerilla war.

Following the Fadaian Khalq’s attack against the Siahkal Gendarmerie post on February 8, 1971, MEK planned to blow up a power station to disrupt the August 1971 celebration to mark the 2500th anniversary of the Persian monarchy. However, they failed and so many arrests were made. Some 70 members and leaders of the group ended up in Shah’s prison. Twelve out of 13 major leaders of the group as well as 9 other members were executed. According to General Nasiri, the then head of SAVAK, Massoud Rajavi’s sentence had been mitigated to life imprisonment due to his effective cooperation with SAVAK. Following the execution of its leaders, MEK carried out a string of terrorist attacks, including raiding a Police station in Tehran in May 1972, exploding the office of This Week due to fostering the western culture in Iran, bombing the tomb of Reza Shah and the facilities of several US companies in Iran, including Pepsi Cola, General Motors, Shell Oil, Hotel International, Pan-Am Airlines, etc.

How MEK Tries to Revive the Militia of Saddam



The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA) is a label invented by the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) and took by some individuals to describe the so-called Military Wing of this group. However, those who are familiar with the MEK know the wrongness of this designation. That is because members of this terrorist cult along with its leaders are either actual or potential military forces.

The NLA was established in 1987 during Saddam's regime. Formed by a few thousand members of the MEK, this militant entity was equipped by Saddam with a variety of light and heavy weapons including various models of tanks, cannons, helicopters, and fifteen military camps in different parts of Iraq.

Carrying out terrorist acts in the border areas of Iran, numerous military attacks on Iranian territory during the Iraq-Iran war, and cooperating with Saddam's regime in the widespread repression of Iraqi Kurds and Turkmen in the north and Shiites in the south of Iraq after the Persian Gulf War are among the actions of the MEK's army which took place in cooperation with the dictator of Iraq. Scattered bombings in various parts of Iran during the 1990s, which killed dozens of innocent Iranian citizens, were also part of the terrorist activities of the Liberation Army.



After the MEK's forcible disarmament in 2003, the Liberation Army was disintegrated. Taking advantage of this forced event, the group introduced itself as an opposition group and political opponent of Iran. However, this show was oriented to foreigners to disguise the group's terrorist nature and did not pursue any internal goals.

During all these years, the MEK tried to masquerade itself as a democratic political group to international public opinion and foreign political officials. Hypocritically, they behave completely otherwise when interacting inside the country. This paradox is highly visible in the group leader's message on June 20, 2021, and the subsequent developments.

Eighteen years after forcible disarmament of the group and the disintegration of the national liberation army, in a hateful message on June 20, Rajavi, leader of the group, announced the formation of the new militia of the liberation army entitled Fifth Round of the Liberation Army's Founders. Afterward, the official Persian website of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization distributed tens of images and recorded videos of armed men claiming that they are citizens who have joined the Fifth Round of the Liberation Army's Founders as a response to Rajavi's call.

The question that the MEK leader should answer is that why the videos of the people

with guns in hand using violent literature are not released on the group's English websites so that their non-Persian supporters can see them too? Why did the MEK, in its annual gathering held in Tirana this year, only show their international guests the images of unarmed members of the Fifth Round of the Liberation Army's Founders and not the armed ones? Isn't this so deceitful, hateful, and violent that the Mojahedin has no inclination to let the world see the reality and its true nature?

The Iranian people know the Mojahedin-e Khalq and its history very well and this group should not be mistaken for a democratic political group. There are foreign figures who, due to political reasons, do not want to face the truth. We suggest that they get to know the nature of this cult. The MEK had been a militia and now almost after two decades, they are reviving their militia under different titles.

During the activity of MEK's Liberation Army, the Iraqi dictator Saddam, in flagrant disregard of international law, was their sole supporter. Now that Saddam is gone, are the Mojahedin-e Khalq supporters seeking to assume the role of the former Iraqi dictator?

Victims of Januaray

Three months after the 20 June 1981 revolt and given the disturbed situation inside the country and the Ba'athists' invasion to the western borders, the MEK launched another armed uprising on September 27, 1981 aiming to mess up the internal situation and take control of the country. In mid-September 1960, the organization issued an analysis indicating that large-scale bombings and


assassinations have created the necessary ground for the people to rise up against the government and overthrow it. They believed at the time that the explosion of the masses only needs a spark such as an uprising or a riot. As the result of that riot, 31 civilians and military personnel were killed, and more than 150 MEK were arrested.



M.F Moqaddam
Date: January 5, 1982
Terror By: MEK
Occupation: Salesperson



Taleb Kazemi
Date: January 10, 1982
Terror By: MEK
Occupation: Tailor



Javad Sobhani
Date: January 20, 1982
Terror By: MEK
Occupation: Salesperson



M. Cham Haidari
Date: January 24, 2006
Terror By: ASMLA,
Occupation: Technician



D.C Zanganeh
Date: January 24, 2006
Terror By: ASMLA
Occupation: Salesperson



J. Mazrinejad
Date: January 24, 2006
Terror By: ASMLA
Occupation: Technician



Fatemeh Aqajari
Date: January 24, 2006
Terror By: ASMLA
Occupation: housewife



Maryam Daneshian
Date: January 24, 2006
Terror By: ASMLA
Occupation: Student

